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docs: close provider credential boundary review

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mARTin-B78 2026-09-04 09:08:31 +02:00
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2
CHANGELOG.md
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@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/) · versioned wi
status/cancellation endpoints with timeout and failure states; existing synchronous callers remain compatible. status/cancellation endpoints with timeout and failure states; existing synchronous callers remain compatible.
- **STT Cancellation Safety.** Queued transcription cancels before consuming the single STT slot, and timed-out - **STT Cancellation Safety.** Queued transcription cancels before consuming the single STT slot, and timed-out
requests keep the device slot held until the underlying worker actually exits. requests keep the device slot held until the underlying worker actually exits.
- **Credential Boundary Review.** Provider credentials are now documented as server-only; only the explicitly
regenerated external caller key crosses to the UI, with no-store delivery and no browser-storage persistence.
- **API Boundary Hardening.** External API authentication is enabled by default, request and mutation limits are - **API Boundary Hardening.** External API authentication is enabled by default, request and mutation limits are
enforced, and settings responses redact provider credentials for non-browser callers. enforced, and settings responses redact provider credentials for non-browser callers.
- **Server-side Provider Credentials.** Provider keys are now masked even for same-origin Settings responses, are - **Server-side Provider Credentials.** Provider keys are now masked even for same-origin Settings responses, are

11
TODO.md
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@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ the first block before investing in architecture or polish.
### P0 — do first ### P0 — do first
- [ ] **S — Stop API keys from reaching frontend JavaScript or logs.** Provider keys are now masked in settings - [x] **S — Stop provider API keys from reaching frontend JavaScript or logs.** Provider keys are masked in settings
responses and probes use server-side credentials; finish the external-client key handoff and audit remaining responses, probes resolve credentials server-side, and browser storage/log paths are clean. The separate external
transient input/error paths. caller key is available only through deliberate regeneration, uses `no-store`, and is not retained by the UI.
- [x] **S — Validate uploaded filenames and paths.** Upload endpoints reject traversal, path separators and control - [x] **S — Validate uploaded filenames and paths.** Upload endpoints reject traversal, path separators and control
characters before deriving extensions; ZIP imports reject absolute, traversal and malformed archive members. characters before deriving extensions; ZIP imports reject absolute, traversal and malformed archive members.
- [x] **M — Add upload, request-size, temporary-file and concurrent-job limits.** Endpoint-specific upload/request - [x] **M — Add upload, request-size, temporary-file and concurrent-job limits.** Endpoint-specific upload/request
@ -138,8 +138,9 @@ the first block before investing in architecture or polish.
## P0 — Security ## P0 — Security
- [ ] Never expose API keys to frontend JavaScript or logs. Provider keys are masked on read and absent from browser - [x] Never expose provider API keys to frontend JavaScript or logs. Provider keys are masked on read and absent from
storage; the deliberate external-client key display and transient entry path still need a final design review. browser storage; the external-client key is an intentional, explicit handoff for caller authentication and its
regeneration response is non-cacheable.
- [x] Validate uploaded filenames and paths. - [x] Validate uploaded filenames and paths.
- [x] Strictly validate custom URLs to prevent SSRF, with private destinations available only when explicitly allowed - [x] Strictly validate custom URLs to prevent SSRF, with private destinations available only when explicitly allowed
for local provider/container operation. for local provider/container operation.